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"No-Prejudice" No More:
New York and the Death of the
No-Prejudice Rule
ERIc TAUSEND*

States differ in how they treat situations where an insured has not timely notified its
insurer after an accident, claim, or loss. While the majority of states apply the "noticeprejudice" rule (which requires an insurer to show that the late notice prejudiced it
before it can disclaim coverage), a minority of states apply the common law "noprejudice" rule, which allows an insurer to disclaim coverage after late notice,
regardless of whether it has been prejudiced. Until recently, New York State was one of
the most zealous adherents to the no-prejudice rule, rigidly applying it and ignoring the
often inequitable results. However, recently passed legislation has changed New York's
approach to late notice and brought it closer to the majority position by requiring the
use of the notice-prejudicerule in liabilitypolicies.
This Note examines the various approaches that states use to address late notice, with a
particularfocus on late notice in New York and the recent change in New York's law.
New York occupies a uniquely influential position on insurancepractices. As a result,
New York's abandonment of the no-prejudice rule is likely to have an impact far
beyond its borders. While the recent legislation is certainly a step in the right direction,
this Note argues that it contains a number of provisions, which may prove to be
problematic, and provides suggestions as to how courts should interpret them.
Specifically, these provisions are: (r) the law's limited application to liability policies
only, (2) how the law allocates the burden of showing prejudice, (3) the law's definition
of prejudice, and (4) potential retroactiveapplication of the law.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2010. 1 am grateful to
Dean Leo Martinez for his guidance and support. I would also like to thank the many editors of the
Hastings Law Journal for their tireless work preparing this Note for publication. A very special thanks
to my friends and family for their love and support through the years, and to Liz, whose love and
encouragement made this possible. Lastly, I would like to dedicate this Note to Michael Haffner, the
best friend a guy could ever hope for. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION

Nearly every insurance policy contains a notice provision detailing
how and when notice of a claim or loss is to be provided to an insurer.'
Typically written, notice provisions create a duty for the insured. 2 For
instance, a common notice provision in liability policies requires the
insured to notify the insurer of any occurrence, accident, claim, or suit
that may expose the insured to liability or that may impose upon the
insurer a duty to defend or indemnify its insured.3

i. ROBERT H. JERRY, 11 & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 599-600 (4th
ed. 2007).
2.

22 ERIC MILLs HOLMES,

RICHMOND, supra note i,

at 601;I

HOLMES' APPLEMAN
NEW APPLEMAN

ON INSURANCE

2D,

§ 139-1

(2003): JERRY &

INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE

§ 9.07-9.09

(Jeffrey E. Thomas et al. eds., 2oo8).

3. To illustrate, the Insurance Services Office Inc.'s 1992 Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form provides:
2. Duties in The Event Of Occurrence, Offense, Claim or Suit.
a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an "occurrence" or an
offense which may result in a claim.-...
b. If a claim is made or "suit" is brought against any insured, you must:
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The notice provision serves numerous purposes;4 however, the
rationale courts and commentators most often cite is that providing
prompt and timely notice to the insurer allows the insurer to conduct a
thorough investigation of the underlying claims in order to prevent fraud,
promptly settle claims, and mount an effective defense when dealing with
liability policies.5 As a thorough investigation is often contingent on
receipt of prompt notice, most policies require notice "as soon as
practicable," "as soon as possible," or "immediately" after a loss,
accident, claim, or suit.6 Despite the apparent differences in these timing
requirements, courts generally interpret these provisions to simply
require notice within a reasonable amount of time.' Accordingly, the
focus of this Note is how courts treat situations where notice to the
insurer is not provided within a reasonable amount of time.
At first blush, the notice provision might not seem like much more
than a standard contractual provision that the parties are generally free
to ignore with impunity. However, notice provisions have a deceptively
large bite-or at least they once did. Under the common law, and still in
a minority of jurisdictions today, an insured's unexcused failure to
comply with a policy's notice provision-by failing to provide notice to
the insurer within a reasonable amount of time-results in a complete
forfeiture of coverage. 8 The common-law rule is now generally referred
to as the "no-prejudice" rule because, under this rule, the insurer does
not need to show that it was prejudiced by the late notice for it to deny
coverage under the policy.?

2.

Notify us as soon as practicable.

You must see to it that we receive written notice of the claim or "suit" as soon as
practicable.
I SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 415 (4th
ed. 1995).
4. 22 HOLMES, supra note 2, § 139.2; 13 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE 3D, § 186:14 (199); see also Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 571, 573
(N.Y. 1992) (discussing the various purposes of the notice provision in the context of New York State
law).
5. See, e.g, Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 822 F.2d 267, 271 (2d
Cir. 1987); Vt. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417, 421 (S.C. 1994) ("The purpose of a
notification requirement is to allow for investigation of the facts and to assist the insurer in preparing a
defense." (citing Washington v. Nat'l Serv. Fire Ins. Co., 168 S.E.2d 90, 93 (S.C. 1969))); JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note i, at 6oo.
6. 22 HOLMES, supra note 2, § 139.3(A)(3)(a), (c); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 602.
7. See, e.g., 875 Forest Ave. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 322 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55-56 (App. Div.
1971); see also 22 HOLMES, supra note 2, § 139.3 (noting that most courts utilize the standard of "within
a reasonable time"); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 602 (same).
8. 13 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 4, § 193:32; Eugene R. Anderson et al., DraconianForfeitures
of Insurance: Commronplace, Indefensible, and Unnecessary, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 836 (1996).
9. 13 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 4, § 193:32; see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 605-07
(discussing the distinction between the traditional and modern rules).
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In contrast, the modern trend and now the majority position is to
use the "notice-prejudice" rule.'0 Under the notice-prejudice rule, late
notice alone is insufficient for an insurer to deny coverage." Rather, to
deny coverage in most states applying the notice-prejudice rule, the
insurer must show that it was somehow prejudiced by the late notice
from the insured.' 2
For years, New York strictly applied the common law, no-prejudice
rule and refused to acknowledge its inequitable results." New York
State's unparalleled impact on the insurance industry makes its law
particularly important." The state of New York is "one of the principal
insurance marketplaces of the world."" Today most insurance is
purchased through brokers and "[flour of the five largest insurance
brokers in the world have their corporate headquarters in New York."' 6
Even more telling, New York State is an extremely large purchaser of
insurance, representing "approximately 7.38% of the property/casualty
market in the United States,... approximately 9.12% of the life
insurance and annuity [market] and lo.i% of the accident and health
insurance markets... ."" Additionally, New York insurance law can be
and is applied extraterritorially.'8 As a result, the insurance law of New
York is critically important not only to the citizens and corporations of
New York, but also to the insurance industry as a whole and to other
states looking for guidance.

10.

JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 607-o8.

i i. Id.
12. Id.

13. See Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, New Late Notice Law Requires Insurers to
Show Prejudice, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 2009, at 3, available at http://www.srz.com/news/
list.aspx?Professionals=cd58e436-3f8o-4c93-af7d-6fd9fcbb5758.
14. According to a New York State economic development agency, "New York State is the
location of choice for the most important players in the worldwide insurance industry," and the state is
home to "[o]ver 7,200 insurance companies employ[ing] nearly 150,ooo" individuals. Insurance,
Industry Clusters, Empire State Development, http://www.empire.state.ny.us/NYSHomeToBusiness/
IndustryClusters/insurance.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2009); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The McCarran-FergusonAct of r945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of InsuranceRegulation, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 73 (1993) ("New York [is] a major insurance market and home to many of the
largest insurance firms . . ..").
15. I WOLCor B. DUNHAM, JR., NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 1.02 (2009).
16. Id.
17. Id. New York State's share of the U.S. property/casualty insurance market is typically greater
than its 6.4% share of the U.S. population. See id.
I8. Id. § .03; see also Lynda A. Bennett & Andrew S. Zimmerman, The End of New York's
Draconian Late Notice Law, Perhaps, N.J. STATE BAR Ass'N, INS. L. SECTION, Sept. I, 2008, at 16,
available at http://www.rfbclaw.com/upload/o82008IO29s6Article-ThetEndofDraconian.pdf (discussing
how New Jersey insurance carriers are enamored with the New York law); IDUNHAM, supra note x5.
§ i ox ("Other jurisdictions often look to rNew York's] insurance laws and court decisions for
guidance."); id. § 1.o3 (discussing the extraterritorial application of New York insurance law, and the
use of New York insurance law as a model for other states).
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New York's once-strict application of the no-prejudice rule led to
countless insureds being left without coverage for seemingly insignificant
delays." For years, calls for the judiciary to reverse course and adopt the
majority rule went unanswered.20 Ultimately, change would not come
until the summer of 2008 when the New York Legislature and Governor
brought about the modernization of New York insurance law."
With the quick flick of a pen on July 21, 2oo8, New York Governor
David Paterson signed chapter 388 into law, 2 rocking the New York
insurance industry and instantly erasing years of New York
jurisprudence. Chapter 388 amended section 3420 of the New York
Insurance Law so as to statutorily adopt the notice-prejudice rule in all
liability policies issued after January 17, 2009.24 Significantly, the law
abandons New York's long-held position that the no-prejudice rule
applies to late-notice situations, and requires the adoption of the noticeprejudice rule.
This law is a tremendous change for the State of New York. New
York is now more in line with the majority of states, and the decision to
adopt the notice-prejudice rule should have extraterritorial effects in
other states. It is quite likely that other states that have been applying the
no-prejudice rule will follow New York's lead and similarly abandon the
rule. Thus, this action may mark the beginning of the end for the noprejudice rule. Thanks to New York, the no-prejudice rule may soon be
relegated to life solely in the pages of insurance treatises and history
books.
Yet questions remain as to the effectiveness of the New York law
and the effect of the provisions within it. Part I of this Note examines the
different approaches to late notice, the history of late notice in New
York, past judiciary and statutory efforts to change the law, and the
recent and dramatic change in the treatment of late notice through the
passage of the legislation signed by Governor Paterson. Part II more
closely surveys the new law, and discusses the implications of its
provisions, the likely issues that will arise from them, and how best to
deal with these issues in the future.
2

19. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.

See infra Part I.B (discussing the history of the no-prejudice rule in New York).
21. See Peter Molinaro, "No-Prejudice Rule" Abolished, INs. ADVOC., Oct. 20, 2008, at 7.
22. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, bo88-91; Molinaro, supra note 21; Letter from Larry Levine,
Assistant Deputy Superintendent & Chief Exam'r, Prop. Bureau, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't, to All
Authorized Prop./Cas. Insurers et al. (Nov. 18, 2oo8), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2oo8/
clo8 26.htm.
23. See, e.g., Epstein & Keyes, supra note 13 ("For New York insurance law practitioners, New
Year's 2009 will usher in substantial changes to long-standing fundamental principles of New York
insurance law.").
24. See id.
20.

25.

See id.
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TREATMENT OF LATE NOTICE

CONSEQUENCES OF LATE NOTICE

There are two primary rules that states use in the late-notice
context." The first approach, followed in a minority of states (including
New York prior to 2009) is the "no-prejudice" rule." In no-prejudice
jurisdictions, timely notice is construed as a condition precedent to
coverage. 2 As a result, for an insurer to avoid coverage, all that it must
show is that notice was late." There is no requirement of a showing that
the insurer was prejudiced in any way by receiving the late notice.30 Thus,
the insurer need show no prejudice to disclaim coverage.
While notice provisions in no-prejudice states still have teeth, the
majority of states no longer follow this rule and any impact it once had
has been largely eviscerated. 3 Rather, most jurisdictions now apply some
variation of the "notice-prejudice" rule, under which late notice does not
relieve the insurer of its contractual duties "unless the insurer [has been]
prejudiced as a result of the late notice."3 In fact, until January 2009,
New York zealously adhered to the no-prejudice rule.3 3 As recently as
2005, the highest court in New York expressly declined to reexamine the
rule or change paths and adopt the notice-prejudice rule."
The difference between the no-prejudice rule and the noticeprejudice rule are drastic. Moreover, changes in the law like that recently
undertaken in New York have immediate and monumental effects on
insureds and insurers alike. To illustrate, in the no-prejudice case of
2

26. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 606-o7. Insurance has traditionally been regulated solely
by the states, thus each state has its own insurance law. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § o101
(2006); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1963) ("In
passing the McCarran Act, Congress was attempting to return primary responsibility for insurance
regulation to the states; only when a state had not acted, would federal legislation become effective.").
27. 13 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 4, § 193:32. After New York's recent change in its law, only a
handful of jurisdictions still adhere to the no-prejudice rule. See, e.g., NatI R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Lexington Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43-45 (D.D.C. 2oo6); S.B. Corp. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 88o F. Supp. 751, 755-57 (D. Nev. 1995); Haston v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 662 So. 2d
1138, 1141 (Ala. 1995); Caldwell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.. 385 S.E.2d 97. 99 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989); Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 501 P.2d 706, 712-13 (Idaho 1972), overruled in part on other grounds
by Sloviaczek v. Estate of Puckett, 565 P.2d 564, 568 (Idaho 1977); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Livorsi
Marine, Inc., 856 N.E.2d 338, 346-48 (Ill. 2oo6); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walton, 423 S.E.2d 188,
192 (Va. 1992).
28. 13 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 4, § 193:32.
29. 22 HOLMEs, supra note 2, § 139.1 (B); 13 Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 4,

§ 193:32.

30. Supra note 29.
31. Sec Brandon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co..-769 N.E.2d 8io, 813
n-3
(N.Y. 2002).
32. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note x. at 607.
33. See William Brennan, NY. Requires Showing of Prejudice Before Insurers Disclaim
Notice, INs. J.. Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/2oo8/o8/o6/92396.htm.
34. Argo Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 827 N.E.2d 762, 763-65 (N.Y. 2005).

for Late
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Reina v. United States Casualty Co., the plaintiff owned two cars." The
plaintiff insured his first car with United States Casualty Company and
insured his second car with Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, a
separate insurance provider. 6 When the policy on his second car lapsed,
the plaintiff decided to insure both cars with United States Casualty."
The plaintiff's second car was then involved in an injury accident and the
plaintiff inadvertently sent notice of the accident to Hartford, thinking
that his second car was still insured with them and forgetting his decision
to insure both cars with United States Casualty.'8 As a result of this
mistake, United States Casualty, the actual insurer of the second car, did
not receive notice of the accident until twenty-six days after it occurred.39
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division found the delay in
notice inexcusable and ruled in favor of the insurer, United States
Casualty, finding that there was no coverage because the insured had not
provided notice within a reasonable amount of time.40 Beyond this case,
there are countless examples in New York case law applying the noprejudice rule and finding similar delays in notice also unreasonable as a
matter of law. 4'
Compared to the harsh realities of the New York no-prejudice rule
in cases such as Reina, the notice-prejudice rule has far more equitable
results. An illustrative notice-prejudice case is Barnes v. Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Co." In Barnes, the son of the insureds was killed in a
car accident, and the insureds sought coverage under the uninsured
motorist provision of their automobile insurance policy.43 Notice of the
accident and death was not provided to the insurer until over two-and-ahalf years after the accident occurred." The court held that despite the
obvious delay in providing notice, the late notice had not prejudiced the
insurer and thus the insurer was required to cover the claim.45 As these
two cases illustrate, whether a given jurisdiction follows the no-prejudice
rule or the more lenient notice-prejudice rule can make a tremendous
difference for both the insured and the insurer.

35. 239 N.Y.S. 196, 197 (App. Div. 1930).
36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 197-98.

41. See New York v. Ludlow's Sanitary Landfill, Inc. 5o F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)
(citing numerous New York cases ruling that notice received within one to two months was late as a
matter of law).
42. 308 So. 2d 326 (La. 1975).

43. Id. at 327.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 330.
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TOWARDS A

For decades, New York courts embraced the view that late notice to
an insurer bars coverage.46 This position was continually justified with a
number of reasons, including that "the insurer [must have] an
opportunity to protect itself"; 4 7 "'that without timely notice, 'an insurer
may be deprived of the opportunity to investigate a claim and is rendered
vulnerable to fraud"';"48 that late 'notification may. . . prevent the
insurer from providing a sufficient reserve fund"; 49 that "prompt notice
permits the ... insurer to make an early estimate of potential exposure,
to investigate the claim while witnesses and facts are available, and to
take steps to prevent fraud"; 50 and that "early notice enables the insurer,
inter alia, to exercise early control over the claim and enhances the
possibility of settlement." 5' Despite strong adherence to the no-prejudice
rule for decades, and the many justifications for its use, beginning in the
1990s, the New York Court of Appeals began the process of its erosion
by carving out a number of limited exceptions to the rule.
In 1992, in Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance
Co., the court crafted an exception to the no-prejudice rule when dealing
with contracts for reinsurance. 5 3 The court reasoned that the policy

46. See, e.g., Briggs Ave. LLC v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover, 899 N.E.2d 947, 948-49 (N.Y. 2008);
Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Ins. Co., 833 N.E.2d 1196, 1197 (N.Y. 2005); Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76,78 (N.Y. 1972).

47. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1992) (alteration in
original) (quoting Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 293 N.E.2d at 78).
48. Id. (quoting Power Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (App. Div.

1986)).
49.
50.
51.
(2d Cir.

(alteration in original).
Id.
Id. (citing Sec. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century Cas. Co., 531 F.2d 974, 978 (ioth Cir. 1976)).
Id. (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 822 F.2d 267, 271
1987)).

52. See, e.g., Rekemeyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 828 N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (N.Y. 2005);

Brandon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 81o, 814-15 (N.Y. 2002); Unigard, 594 N.E.2d at 573.
Note that prior to these larger exceptions, New York law did recognize a small exception to the noprejudice rule when the insured had a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing notice. See, e.g., 875
Forest Ave. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 322 N.Y.S. 2d 53. 54-55 (App. Div. 1971) (good-faith

belief of nonliability); Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450, 451 (N.Y. 1929) (lack of
knowledge that an accident has occurred).
53. 594 N.E.2d at 575; see also id. at 574-75 (defining reinsurance, and clarifying the difference
between reinsurance and primary insurance); Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas.
Co., 358 F3d 757, 761 (ioth Cir. 2004) ("Reinsurance is essentially insurance for insurance
companies."); Excess & Cas. Reinsurance Ass'n v. Ins. Comm'r, 656 F.2d 491, 492 (9th Cir. 1981)
("Reinsurance is a special form of insurance obtained by insurance companies to help spread the
burden of indemnification. A reinsurance company typically contracts with an insurance company to
cover a specified portion of the insurance company's obligation to indemnify a policyholder in the
event of a valid claim. This excess insurance, as it is called, enables the insurance companies to write
more policies than their reserves would otherwise sustain since its [sic] guarantees the ability to pay a
part of all claims. The reinsurance contract is not with the insured/policyholder, When a valid claim is
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reasons for applying the no-prejudice rule in the primary insurance
context were not present when dealing with reinsurance, so the noprejudice rule should not apply.54 The court noted the important
differences between reinsurance and primary insurance contracts,
namely, that reinsurance contracts are between sophisticated insurance
companies." There is no individual insured involved. 6 As a result, there
is no duty to defend or to investigate." In the reinsurance context, the
interests of the primary insurer and the reinsurer are aligned, whereas in
primary insurance, the interests of the insured and the insurer are often
at odds." As a result of these differences, the court held that the noprejudice rule is inapplicable in the reinsurance context."
In dictum, the Unigard court went on to observe that the noprejudice rule is a limited exception to
two established rules of contract law: (i) that ordinarily one seeking to
escape the obligation to perform under a contract must demonstrate a
material breach or prejudice; and (2) that a contractual duty ordinarily
will not be construed as a condition precedent absent clear language
showing that the parties intended to make it a condition.o

Despite this strong language, and the court's willingness to make an
exception for reinsurance, the court nonetheless did not otherwise relax
the no-prejudice rule.6
A decade later, in Brandon v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., the
court carved out another exception to the no-prejudice rule, this time in
the context of supplemental uninsured motorist (SUM) coverage. 6 2In
Brandon, the court wrestled with the issue of whether to apply the noprejudice rule in the SUM context when the notice of suit was late, but
the original notice of a claim was timely." Again, the court found that
the justifications for the no-prejudice rule were not served by extendin
the rule to a late notice of suit when the notice of a claim was timely. F
The court held that while a timely notice of suit "may indeed help SUM
made, the insurance company pays the first level insured, and the reinsurance company pays the
insurance company. The reinsurance company's obligation is to the insurance company, and the
insurance company vis-a-vis the reinsurer is thus the insured, or more appropriately the 'reinsured.'"
(citation omitted)); Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345,
350-55 (2009).

54. 594 N.E.2d at 575.
55. Id. at 574.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (noting that with primary insurance, there are sometimes "disputes over cooperation or
coverage or over claimed collusion on the part of the insured").
59. Id. at 574-75.
6o. Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
6s. See id. at 575.
62. 765 N.E.2d 8Sio, 814-15 (N.Y. 2002).
63. Id. at 81I1-13-

64. Id. at 813-14.
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insurers to protect themselves against fraud, set reserves, and monitor
and perhaps settle . . . tort actions,"6 5 a timely notice of claim adequately
serves these purposes and the insurer before the court had failed to
establish that any prejudice from the late notice of suit was "so inevitable
as to justify further extending the no-prejudice" rule.
The SUM exception was further expanded in 2005 in Rekemeyer v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." In Rekemeyer, notice to
the insurer of the no-fault claim was timey, but a supplemental notice of
intent to pursue a SUM claim was late. The court followed Brandon
and required the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the late SUM
claim in order to disclaim coverage." Crucial to the decision was a
finding that the initial notice of the no-fault claim "was sufficient to
promote the valid policy objective of curbing fraud or collusion."70
Additionally, it was key that, after the notice of the no-fault claim, the
insurer "undertook an investigation of the accident" and "required [the]
plaintiff to undergo medical exams." 7' The court concluded by stating
that "[u]nder these circumstances, application of a rule that contravenes
general contract principles is not justified."72
In light of the court's willingness to create some limited exceptions
to the no-prejudice rule and to fully recognize that its application was
contrary to basic contract principles, it would have seemed reasonable to
expect the court to soon completely abandon the no-prejudice rule.
However, any chance for such a change was crushed on the same day
that Rekemeyer was decided. In the companion case Argo Corp. v.
Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co.,7' the New York Court of
Appeals expressly reaffirmed the use of the no-prejudice rule in latenotice cases and declined to adopt the notice-prejudice rule:
The rationale of the no-prejudice rule is clearly applicable to a late
notice of lawsuit under a liability insurance policy. A liability insurer,
which has a duty to indemnify and often also to defend, requires timely
notice of lawsuit in order to be able to take an active, early role in the
litigation process and in any settlement discussions and to set adequate
reserves. Late notice of lawsuit in the liability insurance context is so

65. Id. at 813.

66. Id. at 814.
67. 828N.E.zd 970,975 (N.Y. 2005).

68. Id. at 974-75.
69. Id. at 975.
70. Id. at 974.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. See Norman H. Dachs & Jonathan A. Dachs. Legislative Initiatives Regarding the 'NoPrejudice Rule', N.Y.L.J., Sept. II, 2007, at 3 ("[I]t appears that the courts have gone as far as they will
go. and have stopped short of completely eviscerating the 'no-prejudice' rule.").
74. 827 N.E.2d 762 (N.Y. 2oo5)-
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likely to be prejudicial to these concerns as to justify the application of
the no-prejudice rule."
In 2008, the high court again reaffirmed its decision to keep the noprejudice rule." It did so even while acknowledging that by that point,
the legislature had already taken action to abandon the no-prejudice
rule."
As the years went by and New York courts in large part continued
to strictly apply the no-prejudice rule, it had become increasingly clear
that the rule was a minority position followed only in a small number of
states. 8 As a result of this, and the inequitable outcomes that often
accompanied a strict no-prejudice rule application, the rule began to
draw the ire of both courts and commentators." The no-prejudice rule
was often dubbed "draconian" or otherwise criticized for its harshness.
In dramatic fashion, even the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court stepped out of line and criticized the no-prejudice rule
when it attempted to abandon the rule in the 2005 case of Great Canal
Realty Corp. v. Seneca Insurance Co.Y' In Great Canal, a subcontractor
was hurt while performing work on a jobsite.82 The owner of the
property, Great Canal Realty, was informed of the accident several
weeks after it occurred but was told by the general contractor that the
general contractor's insurance company would handle it because Great
Canal was included on the policy as an additional insured.8 3 Four months
after the accident, the injured subcontractor served Great Canal with a
lawsuit." Within days of receiving notice of the suit, Great Canal
forwarded the suit papers to its own liability insurer." Predictably, the
insurer disclaimed coverage on the grounds that notice was late.

75. Id. at 765.
76. See Briggs Ave. LLC v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover, 899 N.E.2d 947, 948 (N.Y. 2oo8).
77. Id. at 949 ("The Legislature, weighing the competing interests at stake, has recently enacted
legislation that strikes a different balance, more favorable to the insured, but that legislation has not
yet become effective. The common-law no-prejudice rule applies to this case." (citation omitted)).
78. See, e.g., Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Ins. Co., 787 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (App. Div. 2004),
rev'd, 833 N.E.2d 1196, 1197 (N.Y. 2005); see also Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 P.3d
223, 228 (Co0. 2001); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 850-51 (Tenn. 1998); JERRY & RICHMOND,
supra note i,at 6o6.
79. See, e.g., Clementi, 16 P.3d at 228-30; Alcazar, 982 S.W.2d at 85o-5i; PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins.
Co., 243 S.W-3d 630, 634-36 (Tex. 2oo8); Bennett & Zimmerman, supra note 18; Ann V. Kramer &

Dennis J. Artese, New York Policyholders Look to Legislature for Relief in Late Notice Cases,
POLICYHOLDER ADVISOR, May-June 2005, at I, available at http://www.andersonkill.com/publications/pa/
pdfl200505-o6.pdf.
8o. See supra note 79.
81. 787 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
82. Id. at 22-23-.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id
Id
Id.
Id.
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On appeal, the Appellate Division adopted the notice-prejudice rule
and held that "a triable issue of fact exist[ed]" as to whether the insurer
had been prejudiced by the late notice. In reversing years of precedent,
the court stressed the adhesive nature of insurance contracts and the
windfall that insurers receive from denying late notice claims simply
"because [they] could."88 The court noted that "the time has come ... to
look at 'the end which ought to be attained' and acknowledge that
freedom of contract is a fiction when applied to insurance policies."" In
attacking the no-prejudice rule, the court reasoned that under the
current rule "the insurer has been granted, wholly through judicial
largess, the benefit of a conclusive presumption of prejudice."9
Ultimately, the court held that it could "see no reason to extend the 'noprejudice' exception to allow insurers to disclaim coverage on the basis
of late notice of claim where 'lateness' is an arbitrary temporal standard
applied to a lapse between occurrence and notice, and where contractual
rights favor just one party, the insurer."91
As one might expect, the New York Court of Appeals did not agree
with the lower court and quickly reversed the Appellate Division's
decision in a succinct three-paragraph opinion that did not address any of
the policies central to the lower court opinion. 92 If a substantive change
in New York's application of the no-prejudice rule was going to come, it
would have to come from the legislature, because the high court had
shown that it was not yet ready to abandon the rule.
C.

ROUND i: THE FIRST

ArrEMPT

AND THE SPITZER VETO

Legislative attempts to change the no-prejudice rule in New York
date back several years, but it was not until 2007 that the attempts made
any serious impact.93 On June 17, 2007, Senate Bill 6306 was introduced
in the New York State Senate.9 4 The stated purpose of the bill was, inter
alia, to "prevent[] a property/casualty insurer from denying coverage on
the basis of late notice of claim, unless such insurer can demonstrate that
they were 'materially' prejudiced by such late notice." 95 In addition to the
late notice portion of the bill, there was also a portion that permitted an
injured third party to request a declaratory judgment and file a direct
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 25.

9!. Id. at 29.
92. Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Ins. Co., 833 N.E.2d

i196,

1197 (N.Y. 2005).

93. Kramer & Artese, supra note 79, at i. 3.
94. S. 6306, 2007-2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007).
95. New York State Senate Introducer's Memorandum in Support (2007), in N.Y. GOVERNOR S
VETO JACKET NO. 98, VETO OF 5. 6306, at 17, 17 (2007) [hereinafter VETO JACKET NO. 981. available at
http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/956I2.pdf.
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action against the insurer in order to determine whether insurance
coverage was available.96 In less than one week, the bill was passed by
both the New York State Senate and State Assembly.97 Interestingly, the
New York State Legislature's last day before summer recess was June 21,
2007, the same day that the State Assembly passed the bill and only four
days after the bill's introduction." Shortly after the bill's eleventh hour
passage in the legislature, the bill was presented to Governor Eliot
Spitzer to sign into law. 99
Letters immediately began pouring into the Governor's office
calling for the Governor to veto the bill on numerous grounds.'"' Some
defended the status quo and the existing New York no-prejudice rule,
calling it "a workable standard"'0 ' and arguing that "existing New York
law protects policyholders."' 2 Others called attention to the seemingly
hasty fashion in which the bill was passed at the end of the legislative
session.0 3 Numerous groups attacked the bill based on their belief that, if
signed into law, the "bill will both raise the cost of doing business in New
York, and damage the state's attractiveness as a location for new and
expanding businesses."104

However, the most powerful attacks on the bill were the substantive
attacks on the actual text and provisions of the bill. Critics attacked the

96. Memorandum from Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. State Governor, to the New York State Senate (Aug.
I, 2007), in VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 5, 5-6. This Note focuses exclusively on the late-

notice aspects of the bill.
97. The June 21st vote in the State Assembly was 132 votes in favor and sixteen opposed while
the June 2oth vote in the State Senate was fifty-six votes in favor and six opposed. See VETO JACKET
No. 98, supra note 95, at 2-4.
98. Id.; New York State Legislative Session Calendar: January-June 2007, available at http://
assembly.state.ny.us/leg/2oo7sessioncalendar.pdf. This fact would ultimately draw much attention and
suspicion to the bill. See, e.g., Letter from Eric R. Dinallo, Superintendent of Ins., State of N.Y. Ins.
Dep't, to David Nocenti, Counsel to the Governor, Executive Chamber (July 23, 2007), in VETO
JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 45, 46 ("[T]he Department takes special exception to the fact that this
bill was passed at the eleventh hour of the legislative session...."); Letter from Zane Morganstein,
President, Associated Mut. Ins. Coop., to Eliot Spitzer, N.Y. State Governor (July 17, 2007), in VETO
JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 41, 41 (noting that the bill was "passed by the legislature in the closing
days of [2007's] legislative session").
99. See VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at i.
1oo. See generally id. The bill was attacked for its late-notice provision as well as its direct-action

provision. See generally id.

iox. Memorandum from N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Torts, Ins. & Comp. Law Section, to Dep't of
Governmental Relations (July 3, 2007), in VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 23, 23.
£o2. Letter from the Bus. Council of N.Y. State, Inc., to Legis. Sec'y, Executive Chamber (July 13,
2007) [hereinafter Bus. Council Letter], in VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 34, 35; see also Letter
from Gary Henning, Assistant Vice President, Ne. Region, Am. Ins. Ass'n, to David Nocenti, Counsel
to the Governor. Executive Chamber (July 53, 2oo7), in VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 37, 38
("Current 'late notice' case law protects the interests of the insured.").
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
Bus. Council Letter, supra note 502, at 34; see also Letter from Zane Morganstein to Eliot
Spitzer, supra note 98, at 42.
£03.

104.
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bill substantively for a number of the provisions it contained.' As
written, the bill applied to all insurance contracts, including liability
policies and first-party property insurance policies, as well as claimsmade policies. o' Claims-made policies have notice requirements that
require claims to be made within the policy period or within a specific
time after a loss rather than the vague "as soon as practicable" standard
in most liability policies." In protesting the inclusion of claims-made
policies, critics argued that to subject these policies to the noticeprejudice rule would vitiate their existing notice requirements.
The bill also came under attack for its immediate effective date,
which some said would make it "almost impossible for insurers to change
their policies and procedures immediately in order to comply with [the]
bill.,"'09 Others raised the issue that the bill required an insurer to show
"material prejudice," which many argued was a very high standard for
insurers to meet." 0 Furthermore, some opined that litigation would be
required to determine the bounds of "material prejudice.""I
In the end, the criticism and calls for a veto were successful. On
August i, 2007, Governor Spitzer vetoed the bill." 2 In his Veto
Memorandum, Governor Spitzer acknowledged that the late-notice
portion of the bill was "an important reform" that would eliminate
"extreme hardship" and "bring New York's laws into alliance with the
laws in a majority of other states."" 3 However, in reference to the directaction portion of the bill, he noted that "there is serious dispute about
the actual impact of these provisions."" The Governor also pointed out
that much of the "dispute seems to result from the manner in which the
bill was passed.""' In stressing the late passage of the bill, he emphasized
that not all of the interested parties had had adequate time to voice their

105. See, e.g., Letter from Eric R. Dinallo to David Nocenti, supra note 98. at 45-51: Letter from
Gary Henning to David Nocenti, supra note 102, at 37-40. Note that the bill also came under heavy
attack for its inclusion of a direct-action provision entirely separate from the changes in the treatment
of late notice. See, e.g., id. at 37.
xo6. See Letter from Eric R. Dinallo to David Nocenti, supra note 98, at 50.
107. See id.

io8.
1o9.

See, e.g., id.
Id.; Letter from Gary Henning to David Nocenti, supra note

1o2,

at 40.

ixo. See, e.g., Letter from Eric R. Dinallo to David Nocenti. supra note 98, at 49: Letter from Gary
Henning to David Nocenti, supra note io2, at 39.
i ii. See, e.g., Letter from John A. DeFrancisco, N.Y. State Senator & Helen E. Weinstein, N.Y.
State Assembly Member, to David Nocenti, Counsel to the Governor, Executive Chamber (July 27,
2007) [hereinafter DeFrancisco & Weinstein Letter], in VETO JACKET No. 98, supra note 95, at 7, 7

("[T]here is almost always litigation concerning the meaning of such key words in a bill.").
112. Memorandum from Eliot Spitzer to the New York State Senate, supra note 96.
113. Id at 5.
I114. Id.
115. Id.
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concerns with the provisions of the bill and, as a result, the legislature
was not fully informed when it passed the bill." 6
Interestingly, despite the procedural problems stressed by the
Governor, he seemed inclined to sign a simpler notice-prejudice bill
absent the direct action provision, stating that "if this bill merely
permitted late notices of claim where there is no prejudice to the insurer,
I would sign it.""' Reaffirming this view, the Governor closed his
memorandum by reiterating the soundness of the goals of the bill and
outlining a plan for his office to work with other interested parties "to
investigate [the] issue further and to determine the impact of these
provisions on injured parties, on insurance rates, and on court
caseloads." 8 The New York Law Journalnoted this fact and commented
that "[t]he governor appears to invite resubmission of a similar bill, at
least with respect to a notice-prejudice standard."" 9
D. ROUND 2: GOVERNOR PATERSON'S SUCCESS
Before Governor Spitzer could follow through on his goal of
working with interested parties to draft a new notice-prejudice bill, he
resigned from office and was replaced by Lieutenant Governor David
Paterson.'2 0 Governor Paterson did not waste any time on the late-notice
issue. He soon "prepar[ed] and propos[ed] his own legislative initiative
for introduction to the Legislature,""' and introduced this proposed
legislation, Governor's Program Bill #65, in both the State Senate and
the State Assembly. 22 Soon after its introduction, the bill unanimously
passed both houses without any amendments. 2 Unlike the year before,
the insurance industry recognized that the prospects for a second veto
were slim. "Since it [was] a governor's program bill, there [was] not much

116. Id.
I 17. Id.
I18. Id. at 6.
119. Barry T. Basis, Insurers Dodge Bullet in New York, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 2007, at 2

(characterizing the legislation as "potentially devastating" for the insurance industry). For an
interesting theory of what truly motivated the Governor to veto the bill, see David B. Hamm, Why
Veto Bill to Amend CPLR 3oo,

Add Ins. Law 3451?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 2007, at 4 (arguing that the

Governor's attack on the direct-action portion of the bill was misplaced, and that it was used as a
"'whipping boy' for the insurers' efforts to avoid elimination of the 'no prejudice' rule").
120. See, e.g., Norman H. Dachs & Jonathan A. Dachs, Status of 'No Prejudice' and Direct Action
Legislation, N.Y.L.J., July 3, 2oo8, at 3, 8.
121. Id.; GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM BILL 2008 MEMORANDUM, PROGRAM BILL No. 65 (2oo8) [hereinafter
PROGRAM BILL No. 65], availableat http://royamura.googlepages.com/GovernorsProgramBill65-o8.pdf.
122. Phil Gusman, N. Y. Legislature Passes Late Notice Bill, P & C NAT'L UNDERwRITER, June 25, 2oo8,

News/2oo8/o6/25-LATENOTICEhttp://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews.com/cms/nupc/Breaking
pg. The bill was introduced in the State Senate as Senate Bill 86io and in the State Assembly as
Assembly Bill Ii54i. Joel Stashenko, New Late-Notice Rule Shifts Burden to Insurer, N.Y.L.J., July 29,
2008, at -2.
123. Dachs & Dachs, supra note 120, at 8.
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of an expectation for [another] veto... "24 As predicted, on July 21,
2008, the Governor signed the bill into law as chapter 388 of the Laws of
New York 2oo8.125

Predictably, reactions to the passage of chapter 388 were mixed.
Those in favor of the law praised the "watershed event" bringing New
York more in line with the rest of the states and celebrated the end of
the no-prejudice rule, calling it "a trap door," "a gotcha' defense," "out
of whack," and "archaic and unfair.""

Those opposed to the passage

lamented the end of the no-prejudice rule, arguing that "the bill is [not]
warranted or helpful" and insisting that the no-prejudice rule was
important for finality and helped to keep premiums low for all
insureds." 7 The one thing that all parties could agree on was that chapter
388 "significantly alter[ed] the landscape of New York's insurance
law." 128

II. CHAPTER 388: THE GOOD,
A.

THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

AN INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 388 of THE LAWS OF NEW YORK 2008

Before analyzing the effects of the changes in New York's law, and
the benefits and problems accompanying them, it is useful to look at the

actual provisions related to late notice contained in chapter 388. As
stated in the Governor's memorandum accompanying the bill, one of the
purposes of chapter 388 is to "prohibit[] certain liability insurers from
denying coverage for a claim based on the failure to provide timely
notice, unless the insurer suffers prejudice as a result of the delayed
notice.""' In furtherance of this goal, the law amended section 3420(a) of

the New York Insurance Law to require that every "policy or contract
insuring against liability for injury to person, ... or against liability for
injury to, or destruction of, property" contains a provision stating that

"failure to give any notice required to be given by such policy within the
time prescribed therein shall not invalidate any claim made by the
insured ... unless the failure to provide timely notice has prejudiced the
insurer."' 30 In addition to the clear importance of unequivocally requiring

124. Gusman, supra note 122 (quoting Peter Tetrault, state affairs manager for the northeast
region of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC)).
125. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Levine to All Authorized Prop./Cas. Insurers et al., supra note 22.
at i.

126. See Stashenko, supra note 122, at I-2, see also Seth B. Schafler & Robyn S. Crosson, Laws on
Late Notice of Insurance Claims Improved, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 2008, at 4. 7.
Gusman,supra note 122.
128. Brennan, supra note 33.

127.

829. PROGRAM BILL No. 65, supra note 121, at I. Again, beyond the late-notice rule, an additional,
major aspect of the legislation was the direct-action portion, however this Note solely addresses the
late-notice provisions.
130. N.Y. INs. LAW §342o(a)(4)-(5) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added); 2008 N.Y.
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that the notice-prejudice rule be incorporated into all covered policies, it
is extremely important to note the scope of the law.
As emphasized in the above-quoted language, the new law only
applies to liability policies and does not apply to property insurance
policies.131 Additionally, there is a separate exception for claims-made
policies contained in section 3420(a)(5).'3 ' The exception allows claimsmade policies to exclude the notice-prejudice language in their policies
and instead include language requiring claims to be made "during the
policy period, any renewal thereof, or any extended reporting period." 33
Thus, the coverage of this law-excepting from the notice-prejudice rule
both property insurance policies and claims-made policies-is much
narrower than the bill that Governor Spitzer vetoed, which by its terms
applied to "all insurance coverage in the state."' 34
Crucial to the implementation of a notice-prejudice scheme is
defining prejudice and establishing the burden of proof associated with
showing prejudice. In defining prejudice, section 3420(c) of the Insurance
Law provides that "[t]he insurer's rights shall not be deemed prejudiced
unless the failure to timely provide notice materially impairs the ability of
the insurer to investigate or defend the claim."' 35 Despite prior
complaints concerning the use of materiality to define prejudice, the new
law largely retains the same definition as the 2007 legislation ("materially

Laws ch. 388, 1o89; see also PROGRAM BILL No. 65, supra note 121, at I.
131. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(a), (a)(5); 2oo8 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, 'o89; No Prejudice Lives in the
Property Insurance World, http:/Inycoveragecounsel.blogspot.com/2oo8/o6/no-prejudice-lives-inproperty.html (June 27, 2008, 12:19 pm); see also discussion infra Part II.C.i (discussing the choice to
exclude property insurance).
132. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(a)(5); 2oo8 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, 1o89; Jeffrey P. Griffin, Note, The
Inapplicabilityof the Notice-Prejudice Rule to Pure Claims-Made Insurance Policies, 42 CONN. L. REV.
235, 269 n.227 (2009).

133. Supra note 132. Most states that have addressed the issue similarly do not apply the noticeprejudice rule to claims-made policies. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 132, at 251-69; Pizzini v. Am. Int'l
66
t7o (E.D. Pa. 2002) (applying Pennsylvania law, and
Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 21o F. Supp. 2d 658,
refusing to extend the notice-prejudice rule to claims-made policies, grounding its decision on both
those of other courts and in the different purpose that notice provides in a claims-made policy); City of
Harrisburg v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co, 596 F. Supp. 954, 962 (M.D. Pa. 1984) ("[T]he purpose of the
notice provision in an occurrence policy [is] to give the insurer time to investigate the claim for
defense or settlement.. .. In a claims-made policy, the provision requiring notice before the end of
the policy period serves a different purpose. It provides a certain date after which an insurer knows
that it no longer is liable under the policy, and accordingly, allows the insurer to more accurately fix its
reserves for future liabilities and compute premiums with greater certainty."); see also Anthony
Bartell & Craig W. Davis, McCarter and English LLP on Notice and Reporting Requirements in
Claims-Made-and-Reported Policies: A Potential Trap for Both Courts and Policyholders, 2009
Emerging Issues 4190 (LexisNexis), at i-3134. See 5. 6306, 2007-2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); supra note lo6 and accompanying text.
This fact will be discussed further infra Part II.C.s.
'35. N.Y. INs. LAW § 342o(C) (emphasis added).
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impairs" in the 2008 version versus "material prejudice" in the

2007

version). "

Under the new law, the date when notice is actually provided to the
insurer determines which party bears the burden of showing the presence
or absence of prejudice. 3 7 If notice is provided within "two years of the
time required under the policy," the burden of showing prejudice is on
the insurer.' On the other hand, if "notice was provided more than two
years after the time required under the policy," the insured has the
burden of showing "that the insurer has not been prejudiced."' 3 9 In
instances where prior to the insurer receiving notice, "the insured's
liability has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,. . . by
binding arbitration," or by a settlement of the suit by the insured, the law
establishes an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.'
The final, important aspect of the notice-prejudice provisions of
chapter 388 is contained in section 8, which provides that "[t]his act shall
take effect on the one hundred eightieth day after it shall have become
law and shall apply to policies issued or delivered in this state on or after
such date and to any action maintained under such policy."' 4' Thus by its
terms, the new law is not retroactive in its effect and, accordingly, its
effect runs only to policies issued or reissued on or after January 17, 2009
(i8o days after the bill's passage on July 21, 2008)." Here, again, the new
law departs from the vetoed version, which would have taken effect
immediately had it passed.143
B. A WELCOME CHANGE AND A HARBINGER OF THINGS TO COME
First and foremost, the state of New York should be applauded for
the important step that it took to abolish the no-prejudice rule. The New
York Legislature's decision continued the modest liberalization of the
rule brought on in Unigard,'" Brandon," and Rekemeyer,146 but went
further than the high court of New York had been willing to go. '4 More

importantly, this change is likely to have long-term repercussions across

136. See id.; supra notes i io-ii and accompanying text.
137. N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(C)(2)(A).

138. Id.
139. Id.

140. See id. § 3420(c)(2)(B).
141. 2oo8 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, o91.
142. See id; Letter from Larry Levine to All Authorized Prop./Cas. Insurers et al., supra note 22, at
I.
143. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
'44. 594 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1992).
145. 769 N.E.2d X10, 8i5 (N.Y. 2002).
146. 828 N.E.2d 970, 975 (N.Y. 2005).
147. See, e.g., Argo Corp. v.Greater N.Y. M~ut. Ins. Co., 827 N.E.2d 762, 765 (N.Y. 2005).
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the nation, and is likely to be a bellwether of further abandonment of the
no-prejudice rule in other states. 148
For far too long New York rigidly applied a rule that was anything
but fair. To put the no-prejudice rule in the proper context, compare, for
example, its harsh effects to those of other activities: "A homeowner can
be late in making a mortgage payment but still keep his home. At
common law, even a dog got one bite. There is no free bite, however, no
opportunity to 'kiss and make up,' for the insurance policyholder."149 For
many states, the only option to avoid this irrational outcome was to
adopt the notice-prejudice rule.
In abandoning the no-prejudice rule, state high courts usually cite a
public-policy concern that justifies the more equitable results of the
notice-prejudice rule.' 0 There are three common rationales frequently
cited by courts: "i) the adhesive nature of insurance contracts; 2) the
public policy objective of compensating tort victims; and 3) the inequity
of the insurer receiving a windfall due to a technicality."'i Each of these
rationales is persuasive on its own but, taken together, they are
illustrative of why so many states have adopted the notice-prejudice
rule. 1
In fact, in Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Insurance Co., the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division relied heavily on two of
these rationales in attempting to abandon the no-prejudice rule. 53 In
adopting the notice-prejudice rule, the court emphasized both the
adhesive nature of insurance contracts as well as the windfall that
insurers receive from disclaiming coverage after having received
premiums to pay for the coverage now being denied to the insured.154
Surprising as it may seem, even some in the insurance industry have
long acknowledged the unjust outcome required by strict adherence to
the no-prejudice rule and advocated for a more equitable result.
According to Anderson, Tuttle, and Crego, by the late 199os,
[a]t least one insurance company ha[d already] recognized the
unfairness of forfeiture. The Aetna Technical Claim Manual affords its
low-level claims handlers great discretion in waiving alleged late
use your
notice, advising that "[i]f there is six months to a year delay,
discretion relative to acceptance if there is no prejudice."' 55

148. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
149. Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 826-27.
150. See, e.g., Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tenn. 1998).
I5 I. Id.

152. See generally Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability
Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured's Failureor Delay in Giving Notice of
Accident or Claim, or in ForwardingSuit Papers,32 A.L.R. 4TH I41 (3984).
153. 787 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24-30 (App. DiV. 20o4), rev'd, 833 N.E.2d 1196, "I97 (N.Y. 2005).
154. Id.
Anderson et al., supra note 8, at 843 (third alteration in original) (quoting AETNA TECHNICAL
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Though this policy manual is thirty years old, it illustrates that those
inside the industry have recognized that reasonableness and leniency are
better policies than strictness and irrationality. Insureds are clients, after
all, and it is in the best interest of an insurer to keep its clients happy and
treat them fairly.
With the clear majority of states accepting the inherent fairness and
justness of the notice-prejudice rule, New York's movement into the
majority is a clear step in the right direction and one that should have
dramatic implications outside of the state. This might be unlikely to
occur with other states but, as New York State is uniquely entwined with
the insurance industry, changes in its insurance law reach far and wide.' 6
With such a large impact on the insurance industry, New York's
recent action likely signals the end of the no-prejudice rule in the United
States. If a state with a massive insurance industry such as New York
adopts the notice-prejudice rule, how can states such as Nevada,
Alabama, and Idaho continue to adhere to the archaic and draconian noprejudice rule?' Moreover, when state high courts take on the issue of
how best to deal with late notice in the insurance context, they generally
survey the rules followed in other states."' If New York is suddenly
absent from the no-prejudice side of the equation, and only a handful of
small states are left, it may be impossible for those remaining states to
not follow suit and leave the no-prejudice rule to the history books.
Furthermore, of the handful of states applying a no-prejudice rule, very
few of their highest courts have actually considered the rule in recent
years."' When they next have the opportunity to do so, it seems likely
that they will have a difficult time ignoring the significant progress that
New York has made and will therefore likely follow New York's lead
and abandon the no-prejudice rule.
As a result, it is quite possible that New York State's adoption of
the notice-prejudice rule in chapter 388 will come to be seen as the coup
de grdce for the no-prejudice rule. Fewer and fewer states continue to
follow the no-prejudice rule and, with New York abandoning it, it seems
likely that it will soon become a relic of the past. More than anything
else, this is the most important result of this law-its greatest impact
might be on the insurance jurisprudence outside of New York rather than
within the state.

CLAIM MANUAL B-5-1 (1977)).
156. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that still apply the noprejudice rule).
158. See, e.g., Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., i6 P.3d 223, 230 (Colo. zooi); Prince
George's County v. Local Gov't Ins. Trust, 879 A.2d 8x, 95-96 (Md. 2005); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982
s.w.2d 845, 8 4WS6 (Tenn- 1998).
159. See Alcazar, 982 S.W.2d at 853.
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388
This section discusses some of the questionable and contentious
provisions in chapter 388. The following subsections will examine how
the law (1) applies to liability policies only, (2) allocates the burden to
show prejudice, (3) defines prejudice, and (4) applies retroactively. It will
also provide suggestions as to how courts should interpret these
provisions.
r. Liability Policies Only
The first potential problem with the new law is that it only applies to
liability policies and still subjects property policies to the inequitable
results of the no-prejudice rule. 6 0
From the limited legislative record, it is unclear whether excluding
property golicies from the new law was intentional or a drafting
oversight.''If it was actually intended, it is unclear if the decision to
exclude property policies from coverage received much, if any,
consideration or debate.162 On its face, the limitation to liability policies
could have been intended based on the bill's stated purpose to
"prohibit[] certain liability insurers" from disclaiming coverage.63
However, as a result of the likely effects of excluding property policies
from the coverage of chapter 388, it is at least up for debate whether or
not this limitation received serious thought or debate.
To be sure, there are numerous differences between first-party
property policies and third-party liability policies, which-at least in
certain contexts-have justified different treatment of these policies.'6 ' In
the third-party context, the insured is subject to potential liability to a
third party and the insurer has a fiduciary duty to the insured. 6 5 By
contrast, in the first-party context, there is no fiduciary duty to the
insured and no potential liability for the insured.' 66 However, these
C.

THE PROBLEMS OF CHAPTER

16o. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 3420(a) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2009).
161. The bill passed exactly as submitted by the governor's office without amendment by the state
legislature. See Molinaro, supra note 21, at 8. Furthermore, it did not go before the insurance
committee in either house of the legislature. See id.
162. See id.
163. See PROGRAM BILL No. 65, supra note 121, at i.
164. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.zd 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985); Dominick C. Capozzola,
Note, First-PartyBad Faith: The Search for a Uniform Standard of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181,
184-85 (2000). Beck offers further clarification of the differences between first-party claims and thirdparty claims. See 701 P.2d at 798 n.2 ("We use the term 'first-party' to refer to an insurance agreement
where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the
insured.... In contrast, a 'third-party' situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the
insured against claims made by third parties against the insured and to pay any resulting liability, up to
the specified dollar limit.").
165. See, e.g., Beck, 7ol P.2d at 798 fl.2.
i66. See id.
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differences are much more relevant to discussions of extending the tort
of bad faith to first-party claims than to treatment of late notice.
In claims for bad faith, the focus is on the conduct of the insurerspecifically, whether the insurer breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing that is read into every insurance contract." As a result, whether
or not there is a fiduciary duty is quite relevant in evaluating the conduct
of the insurer and in deciding whether or not bad faith should be
extended to the first-party context."6 However, when dealing with late
notice, the focus is on the conduct of the insured-specifically, whether
the insured provided notice in a timely manner. As the focus is entirely
on the conduct of the insured, the presence or absence of a fiduciary duty
of the insurer seems irrelevant; it makes sense to treat first-party and
third-party late notice cases similarly.
As discussed previously, courts usually rest their decision to move to
a notice-prejudice standard on one of three public policy bases.'6 To
reiterate, these bases are "i) the adhesive nature of insurance contracts;
2) the public policy objective of compensating tort victims; and 3) the
inequity of the insurer receiving a windfall due to a technicality."o70 In the
first-party property context, the insurance contracts are no less adhesive
than in the third-party context.' 7 ' The insured is often forced to accept
the insurer's terms and has no control over the policy language. 172
Furthermore, the windfall that the insurer receives by disclaiming
coverage is just as inequitable in first-party cases as in third-party
cases.173 In both situations, the insurer is able to keep premiums paid to it
for coverage that it has not provided.
It is true that, in first-party property cases, there is no tort victim to
compensate and no third-party liability about which to worry. However,
167. Capozzola, supra note 164, at 184.
168. See Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 58o-8r (N.H. 1978).
169. See Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tenn. 1998).
170. Id.

171. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 222 (Conn. 1988) ("Standardized
contracts of insurance continue to be prime examples of contracts of adhesion, whose most salient
feature is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary contracts."): JEFFERY
W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.o8(A) (3d ed. 2005) (characterizing all insurance
contracts as not merely adhesive in their nature but "super-adhesive").
172. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. CO., 538 A.2d at 222.
173. See, e.g., Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Post, NO. 204-487, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24415, at *4
(E.D. Ky. Oct. 20, 2005) (applying Kentucky law, and applying the notice-prejudice rule to a first-party
case, specifically noting that allowing the insurer "to deny coverage absent a showing of prejudice
provides it with a windfall, as [the insured] would have reaped the benefit of the insurance premiums
without any liability for subsequent loss"); Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'1 Ins. Co., No. 84-4025, 1986
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29572, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1986) (applying New Jersey law, and applying the noticeprejudice rule to a first-party case, explicitly rejecting the argument that the notice-prejudice rule
should not be applied in the first-party context and stating that "automatic forfeiture of coverage due
to a technical breach in an adhesion policy is inconsistent with any notion of fairness. This is no less
true when the policy involved provides coverage for fire loss rather than liability.").
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as mentioned, the insurance contracts in question are still adhesive and
an insurer still receives a windfall when it disclaims coverage for
nonprejudicial late notice.' 74 Thus, two of the three policy reasons for
applying the notice-prejudice rule are clearly present in first-party
cases.' 75 It would seem, then, that public policy dictates that the noticeprejudice rule should extend to both liability policies and property
policies. Many courts have implicitly held as much in choosing to apply
the notice-prejudice rule in the first-party property insurance context.'17
Such an extension to non-claims-made, property-insurance policies is
logical. The exclusion of property insurance from chapter 388 is
therefore unwarranted. The law should be extended to cover property
insurance.
As a result of the current New York framework that excludes
property policies from the notice-prejudice requirement, courts will be
faced with some difficult decisions in a number of areas.
For example, how should New York courts treat a "hybrid
policy"?' 7 For example, most automobile insurance policies insure
against liability and property damage (collision) in a single policy.178 This
is also true in most homeowners' insurance policies.' 70 Must an insurer
include the notice-prejudice language required by chapter 388 in such a
hybrid policy? Must it only be included in the liability portion of the
policy but not the property portion? These are tricky issues with which
courts will have to wrestle. Furthermore, these hybrid policies have
traditionally been textbook examples of adhesion contracts, with the
insured having little ability to influence the terms of the contract.so
174. See, e.g., supra note 173.
175. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Generali-U.S. Branch v. Genesis Ins. Co., 925 F. Supp. 224, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)

(applying Pennsylvania law); Colonial Gas Energy Sys. v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 441 F. Supp. 765,
768-71 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying California law); Hood v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 846,
85 1-57 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (applying Mississippi law); Pirkl v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 348 N.W.2d 633, 63336 (Iowa 1984); Nat'l Liberty Ins. Co. v. Herring Nat'l Bank, 135 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939). Compare, e.g., Caddell v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., No. o6-o6-ooo63, 2007 WL 1574244,

at *3 (Tex. App. June 1,2007) (applying the no-prejudice rule to a first-party action in a jurisdiction
that follows the notice-prejudice rule in third-party cases, and noting that "the apparent injustice
recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in 1972 in the Cutaia case remains the law as to [property
insurance]"), and Flores v. Allstate Tex. Lloyd's Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 81o, 816 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
("However, the Texas Insurance Board Orders requiring a showing of prejudice. . . are restricted to
automobile and general liability insurance policies."), with Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington
Ins. Co., No. 04-10447, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16724, at *16-17 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2005) (requiring
prejudice to be shown before the insurer could disclaim coverage under a property insurance policy).
177. I use the term "hybrid policy" to refer to policies that insure against both liability claims and
property claims.
178. See I MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 3, at i-II.
179. See id. at 201-20.

x8o. See, e.g., Sprately v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 F. Supp. 595, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("The
insurance policy in question here is an adhesion contract, in that, like other automobile insurance
contracts, it is not the result of arm's length negotiations as to its language."); Farmers Ins. Exch. v.
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To illustrate the problems with hybrid policies, imagine a situation
where a car is struck in a rear-end accident (Collision ). After being
struck, the momentum of the first collision carries the car forward,
causing it to smash into a third car that was stopped in front of it and
injuring the driver of the third car (Collision 2). The driver of the car
involved in both collisions has an automobile policy that provides
coverage for property damage and liability. The property-damage
portion of the policy will be called upon for the damage caused to the car
from Collision i.At the same time, the liability portion of the policy will
be called upon to address the subsequent accident and the injury to the
driver of the third car in Collision 2. Now, assume that notice to the
insurer is late.r8i1
Must the insurer show prejudice to deny the liability claim from
Collision 2 but not to deny the property claim from Collision i? If the
answer is yes, one must ask if that is the result that the New York
Legislature intended. Even if the legislature explicitly limited the
legislation solely to liability insurance (as it seems to have done), logic
would seem to dictate that such a result is a windfall for an insurer that
has received premiums for its coverage, and now is free from providing
coverage to the insured.'

Additionally, it is highly unlikely that an average policyholder will
appreciate the important differences between first-party and third-party
claims and the potential adverse results that late notice would create in
one context and not the other. This is particularly true in hybrid policies
where the policyholder is unlikely to even realize that there are two types
of coverage within a single policy. In some jurisdictions, a court might be
willing to intervene in a situation where a hybrid policy is at issue.
Through the well-established interpretation methods of reasonable
expectations and contra proferentum, a court could interpret the policy
to incorporate the notice-prejudice rule for all coverage.' But in New
York, where contra proferentum is used sparingly, this seems unlikely to
occur. 184

Call, 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) ("[A]utomobile insurance is generally sold through adhesion
contracts that are not negotiated at arm's length.").
181. I credit Dean Leo Martinez, University of California Hastings College of the Law, with
suggesting this hypothetical.
182. See Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Post, NO. 204-487, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24415, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 20, 2005); Yannitsadis v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29572, at "4 (D.N.J. Feb.
6, 1986).
183. See, e.g., E.M.M.I. Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 84 P-3d 385, 389-90 (Cal. 2004) (discussing
interpretation of insurance contracts).
Negotiating,
184. Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keys, Contra Proferentunm Sophisticated Entities
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 2006, at 3. available athttp://www.srz.comn/news/list.aspx?Professionals-cd58e4363f80-4c93-af7d-6fd9febb5758.
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If the exclusion of property policies from coverage under chapter
388 was intentional, it was certainly not well thought out. If
unintentional, this probably occurred as a result of legislative efforts to
exclude claims-made policies from coverage and in response to criticisms
of the 2007 legislation, which as written would have affected all insurance
contracts.' 8 ' If the legislature does not immediately revise the law, New
York courts will have ample opportunity to decide how best to handle
late notice in property insurance policies and hybrid policies. Should the
courts decide to strictly follow the law as set forth in section 3420 (not an
unlikely scenario), we will be-to some extent-back at square-one, with
the no-prejudice rule still alive in some contexts; it will then fall back on
the legislature to remedy the problem.
2.
Allocation of the Burden to Show Prejudice
Another area of chapter 388 that requires further analysis is the
allocation of the burden to show prejudice (or a lack thereof). Under the
new law, the burden to show prejudice after late notice rests with the
insurer if notice is received during the first two years after notice would
have been reasonable.' 86 If notice is more than two years late, the burden
shifts to the insured to show that the insurer has not been prejudiced.""
To begin, the actual point at which the burden shifts (two years after
notice was due) seems arbitrary.'8 Why not one year?18 9 Why not three
years? Perhaps this was a happy medium agreed upon by individuals in
the Governor's office to provide a nice balance between claims that were
presumptively not prejudicial (those where notice came within two years,
so the burden rests with the insurer to show prejudice) and claims that
were presumptively prejudicial (those where notice came more than two
years late, so the burden rests with the insured to show the insurer was
not prejudiced). If this was in fact the case, why was the point at which
the burden shifts set at two years? Were studies conducted that indicated
that two years is the point at which time mere late notice generally
becomes prejudicial late notice? Obviously, this is doubtful but it would
be interesting to see or hear the justification for the decision to shift the
burdens at two years. As will be shown, the entire burden-shifting regime
is complicated and will likely lead to needless litigation.

185. See generally sources cited supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
186. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(c)(2)(A) (McKinney 2oo7 & Supp. 2009).
187. Id.
188. The legislative record does not indicate why the determination that "two years" after notice
would have been reasonable was chosen as the proper point for showing prejudice. See generally
PROGRAM BILL No. 65, supra note 121.

189. Wisconsin, one of the few states that has statutes governing late notice, uses a period of one
year after notice was due to determine whether or not there will be a presumption of prejudice. See
wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.81 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); Neff v. Pierzina, 629 NA..d 177, 183-85 (Wis.
2ool).
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Beyond the arbitrary two-year period, there is likely to be
significant litigation in determining the precise date that the allocation of
the burden shifts. Because the burden does not shift two years after a
loss, occurrence, notice of suit, etc., but rather shifts two years "after the
time required under the policy," the determination of when notice was
required under the policy will be hotly contested-particularly in
instances where a few days difference would change which party bears
the burden.' 90
As previously mentioned, despite different language contained in
policies requiring notice (i.e., "immediately," "as soon as practicable,"
etc.), courts generally interpret notice to be due within a reasonable
amount of time.' Therefore, to accurately determine which party bears
the burden to prove prejudice, first a determination must to be made as
to when notice was actually required. Once that date is determined, one
must add two years to it and compare that date to the date when notice
was given. This is a substantially different process from a traditional
ruling in a no-prejudice case as to whether notice was timely or not
because, in those cases, the only determination made was whether or not
notice was late (i.e., received in a reasonable amount of time); no
determination of an actual date on which notice would have been
acceptable has to be made.'
The key issue then is determining when the clock starts to run on
the two-year period at the end of which the burden shifts. In situations
where notice is provided slightly past two years after an accident or
occurrence, the court will have to split hairs to determine the exact date
when notice shifted from timely to late. In New York, there is a threeyear statute of limitations on personal injury suits, so it is not unrealistic
to imagine some plaintiffs not filing suit until more than two years after
an accident.' 93
Imagine that notice is provided to the insurer two years and ten days
after an accident. The court would have to determine the exact date
when notice was due, or, at least, at what point notice became late. If
notice was due within eleven days, then the insurer bears the burden of
showing it was prejudiced because it received notice within two years
"after the time required by the policy." However, if notice was due
within nine days, then the insured bears the burden of showing that the
190. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(c)(2)(A).
191. See 22 HOLMES, supra note 2, §139.3; JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note i, at 602; see also, e.g.,
Power Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 502 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (App. Div. 1986); 875 Forest Ave.
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 322 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (App. Div. 1971).
Power Authority, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23 (applying no-prejudice rule and finding
192. See, e.g.,

that notice was late but that notice would have been reasonable as early as a certain date and as late as
one month after that date). Rulings like this create windows of when notice would have been timely,
rather than a specific date.
193. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2003).
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insurer has not been prejudiced because the insured provided notice
more than two years after it was due. One can clearly see the huge
importance placed on the finding of when notice is required by the policy
since that bears heavily on allocating the burden between the parties.
Granted, it will not always be unclear which party bears the burden but,
any time that notice comes approximately two years after an accident or
occurrence, it will be a highly contentious issue.
Further issues arise when notice comes more than two years after it
was required under the policy and thus the insured has the burden to
prove that the insurer was not prejudiced by the late notice.'94 Such a rule
seems unjustified because presumably it will be quite easy (and
therefore, not burdensome) for an insurer to show that it was prejudiced
when it received notice more than two years late. After all, it is the
insurer that generally possesses the evidence that would establish
whether it was burdened.'" One must ask if the insurer really needs the
presumption of prejudice. If it is so easy for an insurer to show it was
prejudiced, then why bother shifting the burden? On the other hand, if
the insurer has not been prejudiced by receipt of notice more than two
years after it was due, it seems illogical to place the burden of proof on
the insured.
An additional problem is that the courts will be asking the insured
to prove a negative-that the insurer has not been prejudiced. Courts
have frowned upon such negative proof for years.9 6 Furthermore, much
of the evidence of whether an insurer was or was not prejudiced by the
late notice is not available to the insured."' Even the New York Court of
Appeals has noticed the problems in this situation. In Brandon v.
Nationwide Mututal Insurance Co., it placed "the burden of proving
prejudice on the insurer because [the insurer] has the relevant

194. N.Y. INs. LAw § 3420(c)(2)(A).

195. See, e.g., Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123, 126 (Alaska 1984) ("Information
regarding prejudice is generally more readily available to the insurer than the insured. The insurer is in
a better position to demonstrate that its ability to investigate, defend or settle a claim has been
impaired.").
196. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)
("[P]roving a negative is a challenge in any context."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 2o6, 218 (1960)
("[A]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative. . .."); Charles V. Laughlin, The Location
of the Burden of Persuasion, 18 U. Pir. L. REV. 3, 5 -6 (1956); Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and
Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTiNGs L.J. 239, 249 & nn.34-35

(0985).
197. Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 223, 231 (Colo. 2001) ("'[A]lthough it may

be difficult for [an] insurance company to prove it suffered prejudice as a consequence of an untimely
notice, it appears to us that it would be at least as difficult for [a] claimant to prove a lack of
prejudice.' . . .The Brakernan court chose to place the burden of showing prejudice on the insurance
company because of the adhesive nature of an insurance contract, the severity of forfeiture and the
fact that it was the insurance company who is choosing to disclaim its obligations under the policy."
(citation omitted) (quoting Brake man v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371I A.2d 193, 198 (Pa. 197))).
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information about its own claims-handling procedures and because the
alternative approach would saddle the policyholder with the task of
proving a negative."'
It is true that, in very few jurisdictions, late notice always results in a
presumption of prejudice that is rebuttable by the insured.' 9 Doctrinally,
one could consider this a notice-prejudice located within a presumptionof-prejudice rule. This rule, though followed in some states, is an extreme
minority position (similar to the no-prejudice rule) that has come under
heavy scrutiny." Proving a negative is never desirable, and it does not
make sense to force an insured to do so, whether in the minority of
jurisdictions that follow the aforementioned rule or under the new New
York regime. 20 '
To some extent, the entire shifting of the allocation of the burden of
proof seems needlessly complicated. Only one other state-Wisconsinuses a similar burden-shifting scheme in the late-notice context? 2 It
seems far simpler to adopt the traditional version of the notice-prejudice
rule under which if notice is late, the insurer has the burden to show that
it was prejudiced, and only if it meets that burden can it then disclaim
coveragei2 Under this simple version of the rule, the insurer always has
the burden, which, as noted, is desirable for several reasons. 204 Such a
"clean" notice-prejudice rule is followed in the majority of states."' In
fact, in Brandon, this simple notice-prejudice rule was exactly what the

198. 769 N.E.2d 81o, 815 (N.Y. 2002) (applying the notice-prejudice rule to SUM insurance claims
where notice of claim was timely but notice of suit was late).
199. See 22 HOLMES, supra note 2, § 139.4(C)(i)(b) (citing cases from Connecticut, Florida.
Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin (presumption of prejudice in Wisconsin arises when
notice is more than one year late)).
200. See, e.g., Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 384 P.2d 155. 157 (Cal. 1963) (en banc) ("Although it
may be difficult for an insurer to prove prejudice in some situations, it ordinarily would be at least as
difficult for the injured person to prove a lack of prejudice, which involves proof of a negative."); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345, 347 n.3 (Del. 1974) ("It seems both more
practicable and more equitable to require the insurer to establish prejudice.").
201. See Jones v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Ky. 1991) ("There are two reasons
for imposing the burden on the insurance carrier to prove prejudice, rather than imposing on the
claimant the burden to prove no prejudice resulted. The first is the obvious one: it is virtually
impossible to prove a negative, so it would be difficult if not impossible for the claimant to prove the
insurance carrier suffered no prejudice. Secondly, the insurance carrier is ina far superior position to
be knowledgeable about the facts which establish whether prejudice exists."). As the Jones court
added, "Indeed, it is difficult to imagine where the claimant would look for evidence that no prejudice
exists." Id.
202. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.81 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); Neff v. Pierzina, 629 N.W.2d 177, 185

(Wis. 2001).
203. Cf Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 815, 844-46 (Ct. App. 1993).
204. See, e.g., Jones, 821 S.W.2d at 803.
205. 22 HOLMEs, supra note 2, §139.4(C) ("In an overwhelming majority of states, an insurer may
not raise the failure of an insured to give notice as a valid defense to its obligation to prove coverage
under an insurance policy, unless the insurer can demonstrate prejudice from the insured's failure to
comply with the policy's notice provisions." (emphasis added)).
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New York Court of Appeals chose to adopt in the SUM context.206'It
seems odd to not follow the guidance of the high court, or of any court
for that matter.
Adopting the simple, traditional rule in New York would streamline
late notice litigation two ways. First, it would eliminate litigation related
to determining which party bears the burden of proof. Second, it would
alleviate insureds from the difficult position of having to prove a negative
if notice was received more than two years late. As currently written, the
system of shifting burdens of proof is likely to prove burdensome both to
courts and litigants, and it should be changed.
3. What Is Prejudice?
The definition of prejudice is no doubt going to be another area
subject to extensive litigation." Under chapter 388, prejudice is that
which "materially impairs the ability of the insurer to investigate or
defend the claim."2 8 This is a new standard in New York, and courts will
have to define the bounds of this term and create a body of case law
addressing it.2o In attempting to define "materially impairs," New York
courts are likely to look to the laws of other notice-prejudice states and
their courts' precedent in defining similar terms and concepts.
In notice-prejudice states, there are several variations as to what
type of proof of prejudice is required.2 0 Articulated tests include: "actual
prejudice,"2 "' "prejudice in fact,"' "serious impairment of investigation
or defense,"2 13 "substantial prejudice,"2 14 "material prejudice,"2 5 and

206. Brandon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 81o, 815 (N.Y. 2002).
207. See DeFrancisco & Weinstein Letter, supra note iII (addressing concerns over the use of
"material prejudice" in the 2007 version of the bill and noting that "there is almost always going to be
litigation concerning the meaning of such key words in a bill"); see also Prejudice, Presumptions, and
Burdens of Proof, http://nycoveragecounsel.blogspot.com/2oo8/o6/prejudice-presumptions-and-burdensof.html (June 14, 2oo8, ro:50 am) ("Expect litigation over and court interpretation of what constitutes
a 'material impairment'. The use of the qualifying adverb 'materially' probably means that not all
impairments will sustain a late notice disclaimer. My vision is impaired, but I can wear contacts or
glasses to correct it, so is my impairment material? In other words, how much of an impairment of
either an insurer's investigation or defense will be enough to rise to the level of being 'material'?").
208. N.Y. INS. LAw § 3420(c)(2)(C) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2009); 2oo8 N.Y. Laws ch. 388, lo9091.
209. See Bennett & Zimmerman, supra note 18 ("In all likelihood, the next late notice battle in
New York will be over how concretely carriers must articulate the 'impairment' of their investigation
or defense of a claim and, similarly, how likely it was the lost opportunity to investigate or defend
would have borne meaningful fruit.").
210. See 13 Russ & SEGALLA supra note 4, § 193-50.
211. See Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123, 123-26 (Alaska 1984).
212. See Barnes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 308 So. 2d 326,326-28 (La. 1975).
213. See New Eng. Extrusion, Inc. v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 874 F. Supp. 467, 467-70 (D. Mass.
1995).

214. See Nw. Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693, 693-97 (Ct. App. 1970).
215. See Lighter v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 683 N.E.2d 297, 299-3oo (Mass. App. Ct.
1997).-
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"appreciable prejudice.""' Which of these tests the New York courts
should adopt is debatable. Despite the facial similarity of these tests, they
are each nuanced in their own way, and as they are all different from the
articulated New York test, wholesale importation would be impossible.
In order to find the proper standard, New York courts should try to
glean a legislative intent from chapter 388. In furtherance of that goal, a
letter written to the Governor by the 2007 version's sponsoring
legislators is illustrative even though it discusses "material prejudice"'
and not "materially impairs":
It must first be noted that this phrase [material prejudice] was
originally suggested in an attempt to ameliorate the concerns of the
insurers during the drafting process, it having been felt that this was a
slightly lesser standard than "substantial prejudice," as the original
draft of the bill contained. Because we saw the two standards as
virtually identical in practice, we agreed to such a modification."
Despite this passage describing a different version of the bill, the
articulated belief that "materially" is ever so slightly a lesser threshold
than "substantially" will be beneficial to courts looking to define
prejudice. A reviewing court should draw upon this subtle difference
between material and substantial as articulated in the above-quoted
passage and then review cases from other states to find a suitable
definition for materially impairs within the new law in New York.
Another problem in developing substantial case law to define what
constitutes material impairment is that "what constitutes prejudice to the
insurer and whether there has been material impairment of the insurer's
ability to defend or investigate a claim ... often turn[s] on the facts" of
each case.21 Thus, each ruling might have limited precedential value in
subsequent cases. Though these growing pains are normal, it may take
years for a sturdy body of case law to develop that is capable of defining
''materially impairs" sufficiently enough to provide a shared
understanding of the law by courts and litigants.
4. Retroactivity of Chapter388
According to the Circular Letter released by the New York
Insurance Department, chapter 388 is not retroactive in its effect, and it
only applies to policies issued on or after January 17, 2009.29 Even in
light of this clear statement, there are and will continue to be debates
over the law's retroactive application.
Despite its explicit language that the new notice-prejudice
provisions only apply to policies issued after January 17, 2009,
"[p]olicyholders will quickly point out the obvious-the New York
8

See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Purex Indus., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 872, 882 (D.N.J. 1997).
217. De Francisco & Weinstein Letter, supra noteII.
218. Epstein & Keys, supra note 13.
216.

219. Letter from Larry Levine to All Authorized Prop./Cas. Insurers et al.. supra note 22.
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Legislature has sent a clear message that forfeiture of coverage based on
late notice technicalities should no longer be the law in New York.""
Though this argument is likely to fail, it does not mean that litigants will
not make it or that no New York court will follow it. Since chapter 388's
passage, several courts addressing late notice in New York have
explicitly or implicitly pointed out that the law is not retroactive in
effect.22 ' Even more interesting, at least two litigants have specifically
argued that chapter 388 is in fact retroactive based on the legislature's
clear statement of policy.222 In one of these cases, the insured successfully
convinced the trial court that because of chapter 388, its insurer could
only disclaim coverage if it was prejudiced by the insured's failure to
provide timely notice.22 3 This erroneous decision was reversed on
appeal.224 Expect similar attempts in the future.
Beyond the above attempts to make the law retroactive in a
standard late-notice case, there could be a tremendously difficult
problem in the future with the treatment of late notice in a continuousexposure situation. Imagine a hypothetical-which would conceivably
happen 2 '-where a chemical plant located in New York has a
continuous-exposure injury. From 2000 until 2019, the plant unknowingly
leaks toxic chemicals into the surrounding groundwater and slowly
poisons the local community. Throughout this period, the plant has
primary and excess liability policies issued by several different insurers.
Obviously some are issued prior to 2009, while others are issued
afterward (meaning that some would be subject to chapter 388 and the
notice-prejudice rule while others would not be). Now imagine that for
whatever reason, the plant does not provide timely notice to the insurers
but that not even one of the insurers was materially impaired
(prejudiced) by the late notice. Furthermore, notice is provided within
two years of the time required by the policy, so at least for the policies
subject to chapter 388, the burden to show prejudice is on the insurer.

22o. Bennett & Zimmerman, supra note 18.
221. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 05 Civ 8625, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18735, at *5 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2oo9); Briggs Ave. LLC v. Ins. Corp. of Hannover, 899
N.E.2d 947, 949 (N.Y. 2008); Am. Safety Indem. Co. v. 612 Realty LLC, No. 600347/2004, 2009 WL
2407822, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2009)
222. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dormitory Auth., No. 07 Civ. 6915, 2oo8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87449, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2oo8); Sevenson Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 883 N.Y.S.2d
423, 425 (App. Div. 2oo9).

223. Sevenson, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
Id.

224.

225. For examples of late-notice discussions on the risk throughout the period of loss in the

context of continuous-exposure liability incurred over long periods of time with multiple insurers, see
Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Continental Insurance Co., 000 F.2d 1547, 5554-57 (siIth Cir. 1993), and
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., so F. Supp. 2d 8oo, 8so-x5 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
Aetna Casualty v. Dow found that some insurers were prejudiced as a result of the late notice while
others were not. See id.
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What is a court to do?2 6 How can it apportion liability among the
policies if the pre-2o09 policies were free to use the no-prejudice rule,
while the post-2009 policies were subject to the notice-prejudice rule and
have clearly not been prejudiced? Despite the strong wording that
chapter 388 is not retroactive, a situation such as this might lead a court
to rule otherwise. If damages are in the hundreds of millions of dollars
this decision will have huge consequences for all parties involved.
CONCLUSION

Chapter 388 represents a monumental change for the State of New
York. For far too long the state applied a rigid no-prejudice rule when
notice to insurers was untimely. The results of this application were
anything but fair. The change in the law is welcome and long overdue;
however, it is not without its own issues and shortcomings.
There are likely to be a number of highly litigated provisions in
chapter 388. New York courts will have many difficult questions to
answer. Beyond that, with regard to certain aspects of the law, the New
York Legislature might even need to enact additional legislation to
remedy the gaps and problems that were created by chapter 388. But the
real importance of this legislation will likely be beyond the borders of
New York. As the champion for and advocate of the no-prejudice rule,
New York led a minority of jurisdictions in its application. However,
without the leadership and support of New York, it is likely that the
remaining jurisdictions that apply the no-prejudice rule will soon stop
doing so. It will likely take time but, as New York insurance law goes, so
goes the country.

226. At least one pair of commentators does not think success is likely in this scenario. See Bennett
& Zimmerman, supra note 18 ("[T]he law may have no effect on the 'no-prejudice' rule as it relates to
long-tail liabilities involving historical policies.").

